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Résumé / Abstract
Dans cet article, nous analysons la corrélation des revenus de travail
contemporains avec les conditions sur le marché du travail à différents moments
pendant la durée du contrat. Les données que nous utilisons proviennent du Panel
Socio-Économique allemand, et comprennent la période 1984-1994. Contrairement
aux résultats pour le marché américain, nous trouvons que létat actuel du marché
du travail est important même en vérifiant daprès des valeurs passées du taux de
chômage. Ces résultats sont cohérents avec la présence de syndicats négociant
salaire et emploi simultanément. Toutefois, des modèles de contrats individuels, tels
les modèles de contrats implicites, expliquent une partie de la variance de revenus
de travail et des mouvements de revenu à long terme. De plus, nous étudions
lhétérogénéité des contrats selon certaines caractéristiques des travailleurs et des
emplois. En particulier, nous constatons que les contrats de travail diffèrent selon
le secteur dactivité et la taille de lentreprise. Un travailleur dans une grande
entreprise est remarquablement plus isolé des fluctuations du marché du travail
quun autre uvrant dans une entreprise de taille moindre, ce qui suggère
limportance des marchés de travail internes pour ces firmes.
In this paper, we look at how labor market conditions at different
points during the tenure of individuals with firms are correlated with current
earnings. Using data from the German Socioeconomic Panel on individuals for
the period 1984 to 1994, we find that both the contemporaneous unemployment
rate and prior values of the unemployment rate are significantly correlated with
current earnings, contrary to results for the American labor market. We
interpret this result as evidence that German unions do in fact bargain over both
wages and employment, but that the models of individualistic contracts, such as
the implicit contract model, may explain some of the observed wage drift and
longer-term wage movements reasonably well. Furthermore, we explore the
heterogeneity of contracts over a variety of worker and job characteristics. In
particular, we find evidence that contracts differ across industries and across
firm size. Workers of large firms are remarkably more insulated from the job
market than workers for any other type of firm, indicating the importance of
internal job markets.
Mots Clés : Contrats, Niveau et structure des salaires, Mesure de lemploi
Keywords : Contracts, Wage Level and Structure, Employment Determination
JEL : J23, J31, J41
1 Introduction
Earnings constitute a large fraction of household income, and factors af-
fecting earnings thus have a major impact on the distribution of income.
The secular rise in unemployment in recent years in Europe and Canada
has renewed interest in the interaction between labor market conditions
and earnings. In the present paper, we report results from an analysis
of German panel data in the view of a set of wage models. The results
shed new light on some aspects of the dynamics of German earnings with
respect to labor market conditions, and underlines the fact that labor
markets in Europe are dierent from North American markets.
Specically, we look at how measures of labor market conditions at
dierent points during the tenure of individuals with rms aect their
current earnings. These measures are chosen to approximate dierent
types of contractual models. Following Beaudry & DiNardo (1991), one
can show that the wage of workers who are not mobile across employers
will depend on their alternative (employment) utility at the start of
the current job if employers can commit to long-term contracts, On the
other hand, if they are mobile, current wages will depend on their best
alternative utility since the start of their contract. General equilibrium
considerations are invoked to describe alternative utility as a function
of unemployment. These models are contrasted with a reduced form
model in which the current wage will depend exclusively on current labor
market conditions. This may be consistent with a number of models,
including a standard labor demand model as well as a union bargaining
model. Given the German institutional background, we argue that the
most likely interpretation is the latter, though this is open to argument.
Using data from the German Socioeconomic Panel on individuals
for the period 1985 to 1994, we nd that both the contemporaneous
unemployment rate and prior values of the unemployment rate are sig-
nicantly correlated with current earnings. We interpret this result as
evidence that German unions do in fact bargain over wages and employ-
ment, but that models of individualistic contracts, such as the implicit
contract model, may explain some of the observed wage drift and longer-
term wage movements reasonably well. The elasticity of earnings with
respect to contemporaneous unemployment is approximately 12 percent,
on par with previous studies of the German labor market. The eect of
past measures is about half as strong.
Furthermore, we explore the heterogeneity of contracts over a variety
of worker and job characteristics. In particular, we nd evidence that
contracts dier across industries and across rm size. Workers of large
rms are remarkably more insulated from the job market than workers
1
for any other type of rm, indicating the importance of internal job
markets.
The results obtained in this paper provide empirical evidence in
line with previous articles on implicit contracts in the United States
(Beaudry & DiNardo 1991). It augments and qualies results reported
in the literature on the wage curve (Blanchower & Oswald 1994, Wagner
1994), where current earnings are correlated with current unemployment.
Beaudry & DiNardo (1991) showed that this empirical result is not ro-
bust to the inclusion of unemployment rates appropriately chosen during
the current employment spell. Our results bridge this gap, implying that
the latter result may be an artifact specic to the U.S. economy, and only
partially true for Germany.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview
of the models that we use to obtain predictions as to the correlation
between the history of labor market conditions and current earnings. As
we briey mentioned above, institutions are relevant to interpreting the
results, and we briey describe some institutional background in Section
3. In Section 4, we describe the data used. Section 5 describes the
results obtained and some of the econometric issues relating to these. In
Section 6, we test the robustness of the results from the previous section
across dierent dimensions of worker and job characteristics. Section 8
concludes and oers an outlook to further analysis.
2 Theoretical background
The relationship between wages and unemployment has often been dis-
cussed in the literature. A number of models have implications linking
contemporaneous unemployment to wages, ranging from compensating
dierentials to incentive contracts. Others, predominantly based on con-
tracts, link past measures of labor market tightness to current earnings.
We will expose here the salient characteristics of the most important
ones.
Implicit contracts
The basic idea in the literature on implicit contracts is that risk-averse
workers can only insure themselves with their risk-neutral employers
against shocks to labor productivity. Suppose further that productivity
follows an AR(1) with parameter . The resulting contract will de-
pend on the mobility assumptions for both workers and rms. Assume
that rms can commit to contracts, and that they compete for work-
2
ers, for whom mobility is costly. Then it can be shown (Beaudry &
DiNardo 1991) that wages are rigid during tenure, and will depend on
the alternative wage w and expected productivity 

:
logw
t;t(0)
= 
1
(; ; ) logw
t
+ 
2
(; ; ) log 

+ k (1)
where 
j
are reduced form functions of the structural parameters ,
discount rate  and the worker's survival probability , and t(0) the
point in time at which current tenure started. A general equilibrium
argument relating the change in the worker's reservation wage to the
participation wage establishes the link with unemployment, leading to a
estimable form of (1):
logw
t
= X
0
t
 + u
t
(2)
with
u
t
= U
t(0)
; (3)
where we denote by u
t
the relevant measure of unemployment determin-
ing wages at time t, by U
t
the level of the unemployment rate at time
t. The vector X
it
includes the usual human capital controls thought to
aect a worker's productivity (in logs). Since workers are not mobile,
their wages will be a function only of unemployment at the start of the
job, as denoted by (3).
Costless mobility
If workers are mobile but rms can still commit to the employment
contract, then the contract will be upward exible, being renegotiated
every time the worker's alternative utility becomes binding (Harris &
Holmstrom 1982). Linking as before alternative utility to unemployment
implies that the lowest level of unemployment since the start of the
current contract will be the principal determinant of the current wage.
Thus,
u
t
= min
p2[t(0);t]
U
p
(4)
replaces (3). Once renegotiated, the initial level of unemployment does
not inuence current wages anymore, and wages will be function only of
unemployment rates at the time of renegotiation.
3
Eciency wage
Eciency wage models of the shirking type
1
suggest that incentives to
furnish eort derive from the threat of losing a surplus extant in a re-
lationship. This surplus may be generated by direct mobility costs, the
presence of specic human capital or a number of other reasons. The
link most commonly studied is the one proposed (not exclusively) by
Shapiro & Stiglitz (1984). There, unemployment implies a loss in util-
ity since the probability of immediate re-employment is less than unity.
Thus, there is a benet to the employee of staying with the current em-
ployer. The model thus directly links unemployment to eort levels and
wages. Wages are the carrots and unemployment the stick to achieve an
equilibrium in which no shirking occurs.
Eort e can be either high or low, and can be detected with probabil-
ity q. If caught shirking, the employee is red, in which case he receives
unemployment benets w
0
while unemployed. In every period that he
is unemployed, he will be re-employed with probability a. The incentive
compatible wage derived from the model is then
w = e+ w
0
+ e(a+ b+ r)=q (5)
where r is the discount rate. In equilibrium, the ows out of unemploy-
ment a(N   L) must be equal to ows out of employment bL, so that
a+ b = b=u. Substituting in (5) obtains
w = e+ w
0
+
e
q

b
u
+ r

(6)
which shows a negative relationship between wages and unemployment.
Note however that due to the forward-looking character of the incentive
constraint, the appropriate measure u is the expected value of future un-
employment. If unemployment follows a unit root process, the current
unemployment rate is sucient to form expectations of future unem-
ployment rates. Thus, past values should not inuence current wages
once contemporaneous unemployment has been controlled for, and the
eciency wage model implies
u
t
= U
t
: (7)
Renegotiation-proof contracts
One critique of both of the above models is the lack of incentive compat-
ibility for the employer. The employer is assumed to be able to commit
1
The most cited paper is Shapiro & Stiglitz (1984). See Carmichael (1990) and
Lang & Kahn (1990) for a critical look at eciency wage models.
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to long-term contracts. If the employer's outside option in a contrac-
tual relationship becomes binding, it is however optimal to renegotiate.
MacLeod & Malcomson (1989) (see also MacLeod & Malcomson 1993)
have pointed out that if one increases the contract space by allowing
for discretionary bonuses, then any allocation of the surplus from a re-
lation may be consistent with an equilibrium. The ecient contract
will x a wage at the beginning of a relationship according to a split
of the surplus. Since this split is the result of some bargaining process
between the two parties and thus Pareto-ecient, no party will want
to renegotiate afterwards, except if one party's outside option is larger
than the utility obtained from continuing the present contract. If this
constraint becomes binding, both parties will renegotiate, and the new
contract will reect the split of the surplus at the time of renegotiation.
If the worker's outside options are a decreasing function of unemploy-
ment, then the wage in the current contract will reect the best labor
market conditions since the start of the contract as in the implicit con-
tract model, but conditional on the employer's outside option not having
been binding in the meantime, and conditional on the value of the best
labor market conditions, occurring say at time t > t(0), having been
higher not only than the value of the outside option at time t(0), but
also higher than the value of the contract at time t. Hence, the same
conditions derived from the costless mobility version of the implicit con-
tract model are consistent with the contract model here, but are neither
a necessary nor a sucient condition for this model. Thus, though we
may nd that our results are consistent with this model, we cannot test
it, as our regressions cannot falsify its implications.
Union bargaining models
In models of collective bargaining, a union with a well-dened concave
utility function is assumed to bargain over wages and possibly employ-
ment with a prot-maximizing rm. If the bargaining agenda only covers
wages, the resulting contract locus will coincide with the labor demand
curve, implying a negative relationship between wages and employment,
and thus a positive correlation between unemployment and wages.
If the bargaining agenda covers both elements and bargaining powers
on each issue are equal
2
, the slope of the contract locus will depend on
the union's risk aversion. If the union is risk-averse, the contract locus
will have a positive slope in wage-employment space, thus implying a
negative correlation between unemployment and wages. Heterogeneity
2
See Manning (1987) for an analysis of when bargaining powers are not equal on
each issue.
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in relative bargaining powers allows identication of this curve. The
relative bargaining powers of union and rm are reected in the position
along this curve. If unions and/or rms dier in their relative bargaining
powers, a cross-section of contracts will identify the slope of the contract
curve.
Estimation
The models described above unfortunately have non-exclusive implica-
tions as to the simple relationship linking employment and/or unemploy-
ment with wages. Thus, we cannot in this context test for one or the
other of these models, though we may obtain results which are consistent
with one, but not the other model.
The model estimated is
logw
t
= X
0
t
 + u
0
t
 (8)
where u
t
is now a vector with the three elements described by (3), (4)
and (7). Conditional on the \right" unemployment rate, other measures
of unemployment do not predict wages, and a test of the three alternative
hypotheses resulting from the above theoretical models is equivalent to
a test on the coecients on the dierent measures of unemployment.
If only one element of  is signicant, then we can exclude the other
models. However, as we will nd, results are more equivocal.
3 Institutional background
Our aim in this paper is to characterize the contract structure of wages,
and in this respect, labor institutions matter. The particular impor-
tance of trade unions in the German model has often been pointed out.
This section describes some pertinent aspects of German labor market
institutions
3
.
The German economy is characterized by a high degree of coverage
by collective agreements. Although union membership is around 40 per-
cent
4
, union coverage by either industry-wide or rm-level contracts lies
at around 90 percent of the eligible population
5
. Most contracts are
3
For a good introduction see f.i. Flanagan, Soskice & Ulman (1983), for some
recent developments in collective bargaining Thelen (1991).
4
Author's tabulation from years in which this question was asked for in the
GSOEP. See also Carruth & Schnabel (1993).
5
Bundesministerium fur Arbeit und Sozialordnung (1994). Industries with little
coverage are predominantly in the services sector. Only workers contributing to the
social insurance system are covered by collective agreements.
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negotiated at the level of a regional industry. Thus, collective agree-
ments on wages and earnings are dened for 1 200 region-industry cells
in Western Germany and 250 in Eastern Germany (Bundesministerium
fur Arbeit und Sozialordnung 1994). The number of rms having indi-
vidual contracts with unions outside of the industry-wide agreement has
been slightly increasing in recent years, but it is unclear if the number
of workers covered by these contracts has increased.
Regional and cross-industry dierences exist, but there is informal
coordination by the German Federation of Unions (Deutscher Gewerk-
schaftsbund, DGB). Informal evidence for spill-over eects is widespread.
Furthermore, the Minister of Labor can legally extend contracts to the
whole industry under certain circumstances. Thus, in 1994, the wage
and earnings contracts were actually extended in 75 of the above region-
industry cells (Bundesministerium fur Arbeit und Sozialordnung 1994,
pg. 32)
6
. It has been shown that when rms face a high enough proba-
bility of extension, they will act as if they were actually covered by the
collective bargaining agreement (Margolis 1992). For these reasons, our
data does not distinguish whether or not workers are covered by col-
lective bargaining agreements. Some variation nevertheless exists, and
for many rms, the industry-wide agreement only acts as a wage oor
(Bellmann 1995), allowing us to perform a more detailed analysis in
Section 6.
The duration of collective agreements on wages and earnings is usu-
ally one year. However, in 1988 and 1989, a signicant part of the col-
lective agreements signed had minimum durations of up to three years.
This was apparently a one-time phenomenon linked to the ongoing ne-
gotiations over hours reductions, and most of the three-year contracts
expiring were followed by the usual one-year contracts.
A feature that Germany shares with other European economies is
the severely restricted use of xed-length contracts. Over most of the
sample period, German law restricted xed-length contracts to 6 months.
Though the law allows for renewal, utilization seems to be quite low
7
.
Only about 4.5 percent of workers declaring themselves as working full-
time are on xed length contracts, compared to 6.9 percent of part-time
workers. Women are slightly more likely to be on xed length contracts
then men (7.2 and 4.5 percent respectively).
Finally, the relevant compensation variable we consider are earn-
6
These extensions occur predominantly in retail trade and in the cleaning industry.
7
The degree of utilization in our sample is actually decreasing over the sample
period, though this may be a result of the non-random sampling nature of the GSOEP.
Hunt (1995) describes the changes and estimates the eect on employment. For the
role of xed-length contracts in France, see Abowd, Corbel & Kramarz (1996).
7
ings. Contrary to North America, where blue-collar workers tend to
receive hourly compensation, German blue-collar workers tend to be
compensated similar to white-collar workers, on a monthly or bi-weekly
basis. Thus, 11 percent of workers (in Western Germany) are covered
by contracts which do not dierentiate between blue and white collar
workers, and in which both categories are paid a monthly salary in-
variant in hours. For a further 40 percent of blue collar workers, the
collective agreement, though separate from that for white collar work-
ers, species a xed monthly salary (Bundesministerium fur Arbeit und
Sozialordnung 1994).
4 Data and estimation
The data used comes from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP).
We will briey describe some aspects this dataset that are of impor-
tance to the present study. Wagner, Burkhauser & Behringer (1993)
and Burkhauser (1991) provide a more detailed description of the public
use le available outside Germany.
The GSOEP is a longitudinal panel data set rst created in 1984.
Respondents are reinterviewed each year. Response rates are quite high.
Children are followed separately once they leave the original household,
providing for some non-random compensation for panel attrition.
The questions asked are not restricted to economic questions, ranging
from social to political subjects. Through the structure has varied from
year to year, a great deal of homogeneity has been preserved, facilitating
comparison over the years. A new, East German panel was started after
German unication in 1990.
The survey instrument for the GSOEP was modeled after the PSID,
and tries to avoid some of the problems the latter dataset had. Thus,
the question on job tenure is fairly unambiguous
8
, asking respondents
the month and year they started working for their current employer
9
.
Some problems nevertheless occur. For example, in some waves, a num-
ber of questions relating to the job market and the current job were
only asked of job changers. If this occurs, or data is missing, we carry
forward information obtained in the previous wave conditional on the
worker reporting no change in his job situation w.r.t. the previous year.
8
See Altonji & Shakotko (1987) and Topel (1991) for a treatment of the problems
with the tenure data in the PSID.
9
This author has worked with both the English translation and the original Ger-
man questionnaires, and has found that in some waves, the English translation of
the tenure question renders ambiguous what is not in German. More information is
available from the author upon demand
8
Furthermore, if an individual reports conicting data on the year she
started working with the present employer, we use and carry forth the
earliest report of a date. In this manner, we force tenure to be consistent
across year.
Throughout, we present results are reported for net and gross real
earnings. We would expect net earnings to be the variable of interest
to workers, and thus the pertinent variable in union bargaining, though
gross earnings are closer to the true cost of labor to the employer, and
thus more appropriate in models imposing a zero prot condition. Hence,
it is not clear which to use, and we avoid having to choose by using both
variables.
We restrict our sample to blue and white collar workers with contracts
of indeterminate length who are working full-time, are German nationals
and are living in Western Germany. We exclude workers with xed
length contracts at this stage due to ambiguity inherent to such contracts
in the context of the theoretical models
10
. Due to the unavailability of
data on contract duration in 1984, our sample is restricted to the years
1985 to 1994. Excluding workers in agriculture and in the public sector
as well as civil servants scattered in other industries leaves us with 10
551 observations on 2 182 individuals
11
. Finally, we eliminate individuals
who have only one observation in the sample, since we need at least two
observations to be able to eliminate individual-specic eects. Table 1
gives a summary of the reductions made. Summary statistics are given
in Table 2.
The unemployment data in this paper is the quarterly (after 1985)
and yearly (before 1985) aggregate unemployment rate from BLS les
and thus may not correspond exactly to German data
12
. An eyeball
10
Separation for these contracts is exogenous, except if the contract is transformed
into one of indeterminate length. It is unclear whether renegotiation will occur dur-
ing the short duration of the contract. Furthermore, our data does not allow us to
determine whether a xed length contract in two consecutive years is with the same
employer, and the tenure question may be ambiguous in these cases. Most previ-
ous studies seem to not have excluded these workers. Results obtained here when
including them are not drastically dierent.
11
About half of the eliminations for missing variables are due to missing initial
experience.
12
The BLS vaguely states that \When there are substantial conceptual dierences,
the Bureau adjusts the data to improve comparability or describes the dierences
so users will not draw misleading conclusions. In adjusting data for greater compa-
rability, BLS must depend on the availability of relevant information, and in some
instances it is necessary to make estimates based on incomplete data. Therefore it
is possible to achieve only approximate statistical comparability among countries.
[...] Labor force, employment, unemployment and related measures are adjusted
where necessary to approximate U.S. denitions and standards."(Bureau of Labor
Statistics 1996)
9
Observations Persons
Full GSOEP dataset used 107 252 18 185
Employed 72 396 14 591
Germans living in W Germany 44 700 7 754
Only FT working persons 33 927 6 165
Missing data 17 594 3 233
Excluding agriculture, public sector 12 760 2 603
Restricting to white/blue collar 11 176 2 320
Only unlimited contracts 10 551 2 182
of which:
Men 8 422 1 489
Women 3 378 822
Table 1: Sample reduction
comparison with graphs of German unemployment published elsewhere
(Steiner 1994) conrms that relative levels in the unemployment rate are
not aected by the BLS corrections. Data on the consumer price index
used to deate earnings is also drawn from BLS les.
Contemporaneous unemployment rates are merged into the GSOEP
using the month preceding the interview month, for which earnings are
reported. Initial unemployment rate is taken from the quarter the cur-
rent job is reported to have started if available. Otherwise, the average
unemployment rate over the year in which the job started is used. Mini-
mum unemployment is computed by searching between the starting date
of the employment relation and the current date.
A more complete description of the data treatment is given in a
separate appendix.
5 Results
The main results of this paper are reported in Table 3. To estimate
Equation (8), we have controlled for experience and tenure up to squared
terms, education as measured in years, dummies for industry, marital
status
13
, a linear trend, and, if the regression is in levels, for sex
14
. Errors
13
We use an indicator for the status of being single. Other dummy variables led to
comparable results.
14
Other specications were tested, especially up to cubic terms in experience and
tenure. Embedded F-tests cannot reject a quadratic against the null of a cubic
specication at the 5 percent level, but can reject a linear against a cubic specication.
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reported here are not corrected for heteroskedasticity, but results using
the White (1980)-correction yielded very similar results. Fixed eects
were ushed out by using deviations from individual specic means.
Rows 1 to 3 show results obtained when including only measures of
past labor market tightness. When including both the lowest unemploy-
ment rate since the start of the job and the unemployment at the start
of the job, it seems that each coecient is capturing part of the eect, as
the sum is approximately equal to the coecient when each is estimated
separately. In Rows 4 to 7, the current unemployment is included in
various combinations with the two previous measures. The estimated
coecient on current unemployment is stable across all specications,
and precisely estimated, suggesting that it is orthogonal to the other
two measures. However, as Row 7 shows, once we have controlled for
the initial and the current state of the labor market, the lowest unem-
ployment rate seems to have no eect any more.
Row 8 reports results obtained when ignoring the panel aspect of
the data. Restricting individual xed eects to be zero seems to signif-
icantly bias the estimates on initial unemployment. This is conrmed
by a formal F-test
15
Since the person xed-eect can be interpreted as
individual dierences in productivity, the positive bias is consistent with
some selection occurring in tight labor markets. Intuitively, when labor
markets are tighter, matches are better since employers can lter work-
ers from a longer queue. On average, workers starting a job under these
circumstances would be of higher quality.
On the other hand, both the eect of the lowest unemployment con-
ditions and the eect of contemporaneous unemployment are unaected
by xed eects.
Row 7 thus captures the main result of this paper. The strongest
eect on current earnings is through current unemployment. However,
previous conditions in the labor market are also signicantly correlated
with current earnings, although their eect is only about half that of
contemporaneous labor conditions. The elasticities corresponding to the
point estimates in Row 7 are about 10 percent for contemporaneous
unemployment and about 4 percent for initial unemployment. Neither
a model that correlates only the contemporaneous unemployment rate
with earnings, such as the simpler eciency wage models as well as rent-
sharing and spot market models, nor the implicit contract models are
However, the linear specication cannot be rejected against the null of a quadratic
specication at 1 percent level. It is thus not clear, based upon these tests, which
specication to choose.
15
We can still consistently estimate the eect of initial unemployment because we
consider the person xed-eect, whereas the initial unemployment rate is job-specic.
12
Net Earnings
(a) (b) (c)
Means 3.37 5.91 2.87
(1) Fixed Eects -0.0113 {.{ {.{
(0.0036)
(2) Fixed Eects {.{ {.{ -0.0125
(0.0031)
(3) Fixed Eects -0.0042 {.{ -0.0097
(0.0045) (0.0031)
(4) Fixed Eects {.{ -0.0195 {.{
(0.0019)
(5) Fixed Eects -0.0133 -0.0200 {.{
(0.0032) (0.0019)
(6) Fixed Eects {.{ -0.0190 -0.0102
(0.0020) (0.0031)
(7) Fixed Eects -0.0114 -0.0198 -0.0026
(0.0045) (0.0020) (0.0044)
(8) Pooled sample -0.0039 -0.0218 -0.0025
(0.0045) (0.0042) (0.0062)
(BD) Fixed eects -0.006 -0.007 -0.029
(0.007) (0.0025) (0.008)
Coecients on (a) Unemployment at start of tenure (b) Contemporaneous
unemployment rate (c) Minimum rate over tenure. Signicance at

1%
level,

5% level and
+
at 10% level. Standard errors in parentheses. All
regressions include experience and tenure up to squared terms, education in
years, hours in logs, dummies for industry, marital status (single), a time
trend and if in levels, for sex. Row (BD) is taken from Table 2, row 10 in
Beaudry & DiNardo (1991).
Table 3: Main results
13
sucient to explain the dynamics of earnings.
However, the fact that there is a strong correlation between initial
and lowest unemployment in our sample may cast some doubt on the
result that it necessarily be the initial unemployment rate that inuences
unemployment
16
. The average time elapsed between start of the job
and occurrence of the lowest unemployment rate in the sample is 15
months (27 months conditional on being strictly positive), and for only
40 percent of the observations, this value is larger than 12 months. Thus,
it is possible that we cannot distinguish the two eects. Further analysis
will be necessary to clarify this point.
Table 4 reports equivalent results using gross instead of net earn-
ings as dependent variable. Note that in general, point estimates of
the eect of contemporaneous unemployment are lower, point estimates
of the initial conditions are higher, whereas estimates of the eect of
the lowest unemployment rate remain unchanged. Most important fact
here is that it can no longer be rejected that the eect of initial and
of contemporaneous unemployment are of equal size. Since gross pay is
before payroll and withholding taxes paid by the employee, it is net of
employer-paid payroll taxes. Thus, this may be an indicator of a cer-
tain redistribution eect of the progressive German income tax schedule.
Turning our attention to Table 5, we disaggregate results according
to sex. Our sample is disproportionately composed of men, furnishing
73 percent of sample observations and 65 percent of the sample popula-
tion. Tenure for men is longer, and the distribution across industries is
dierent. Furthermore, since the participation decision is not modeled
here, it is a standard result that coecients may be biased
17
. Part of
the results in Tables 3 and 4 seems to be driven by the female part of
the sample. In particular, female earnings are strongly correlated with
the initial unemployment rate, whereas male earnings are more strongly
correlated with minimum unemployment. Since we do not model the
participation decision, the coecients obtained for the female model re-
main tentative at best. In what follows, we thus concentrate on the male
subsample.
Note that estimates in Table 5 for the eect of previous labor market
16
The correlation of minimum unemployment with initial unemployment is 0.85,
though the hypothesis that they are equal can be rejected, whereas the correlation
between current unemployment and minimum unemployment is not signicant.
17
Heckman (1976), Mroz (1987). Groot, Mekkelholt & Osterbeek (1992) show in
the case of the Netherlands that estimates of the eect of contemporaneous unem-
ployment for women may be severely biased if no self-selection correction is done,
and that current unemployment aects not only the wage but also the participation
decision. See also Strm & Wagenhals (1991) on female labor supply in Germany.
14
Gross Earnings
(a) (b) (c)
Means 3.37 5.91 2.87
(1) Fixed Eects -0.0155 {.{ {.{
(0.0032)
(2) Fixed Eects {.{ {.{ -0.0159
(0.0030)
(3) Fixed Eects -0.0075 {.{ -0.0109
(0.0044) (0.0042)
(4) Fixed Eects {.{ -0.0137 {.{
(0.0019)
(5) Fixed Eects -0.0169 -0.0142 {.{
(0.0032) (0.0019)
(6) Fixed Eects {.{ -0.0130 -0.0143
(0.0019) (0.0030)
(7) Fixed Eects -0.0126 -0.0138 -0.0058
(0.0045) (0.0019) (0.0043)
(8) Pooled sample -0.0031 -0.0135 -0.0058
(0.0045) (0.0042) (0.0063)
Coecients on (a) Unemployment at start of tenure (b) Contemporaneous
unemployment rate (c) Minimum rate over tenure. Signicance at

1%
level,

5% level and
+
at 10% level. Standard errors in parentheses. All
regressions include experience and tenure up to squared terms, education in
years, hours in logs, dummies for industry, marital status (single), a time
trend and if in levels, for sex.
Table 4: Main results
15
Net earnings Gross earnings
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Unemployment: Men Women Men Women
First -0.0050 -0.0257

-0.0052 -0.0275

(0.0053) (0.0091) (0.0052) (0.0093)
Current -0.0214

-0.0183

-0.0162

-0.0082

(0.0024) (0.0036) (0.0023) (0.0034)
Minimum -0.0085
+
0.0105 -0.0126

0.0160

(0.0052) (0.0079) (0.0051) (0.0074)
Signicance at

1% level,

5% level and
+
at 10% level. Standard
errors in parentheses. All regressions include experience and tenure up to
squared terms, education in years, hours in logs, dummies for industry,
marital status (single) and a time trend.
Table 5: Results by sex of respondents
conditions are again fairly imprecise, possibly due to collinearity be-
tween the two variables. Table 6 shows that either one of these variables
will capture the full eect more or less precisely if the other variable is
omitted. At this point, we can only state safely that past labor market
performance matters - it is uncertain which of the variants of the implicit
contracts model better explains the data.
Row (BD) at the bottom of Table 3 reports the results obtained by
(Beaudry & DiNardo 1991) for the United States. In PSID data, the
eect of minimum unemployment rate clearly dominates the eect of
contemporaneous and of initial unemployment rate, the latter not be-
ing signicantly dierent from zero. The German case is more nuanced,
lending support to a mixture or simultaneous presence of two mecha-
nisms. The rst aects current earnings through the current state of the
labor market. A number of models can be consistent with this result, as
we have expounded in Section 2. However, the institutional background
outlined in Section 3 would lend credence to a rejection of a simple spot
market model in favor of a model of rent-sharing. The negative eect of
unemployment can then be interpreted as evidence of risk-averse unions
bargaining over both employment and wages, if bargaining powers are
heterogeneous across industries. The resulting bargaining outcome then
feeds imperfectly into individual contracts, still allowing for aspects of
implicit contracts to have eect.
It may be seen as corroborating evidence that unions have in recent
16
Net earnings Gross earnings
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
(1) -0.0050 {.{ -0.0111

-0.0052 {.{ -0.0144

(0.0053) (0.0038) (0.0052) (0.0037)
(2) -0.0214

-0.0211

-0.0220

-0.0162

-0.0159

-0.0171

(0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0023)
(3) -0.0085
+
-0.0119

{.{ -0.0126
+
-0.0162

{.{
(0.0052) (0.0037) (0.0050) (0.0036)
Coecients on (1) Initial unemployment (2) Current unemployment (3) minimum
unemployment. Signicance at

1% level,

5% level and
+
at 10% level. Standard
errors in parentheses. All regressions include experience and tenure up to squared
terms, education in years, hours in logs, dummies for industry, marital status (single)
and a time trend. All variables in deviation from individual means.
Table 6: Results for male workers
years put a stronger emphasis on reduction of hours in order to maintain
or increase employment. Our results are consistent with this
In the next section we study the robustness of the above results across
several dimensions of the dataset before drawing a nal conclusion.
6 Robustness of results
In this section, we take the sample of male workers and further separate
it into subsamples. Since labor markets may function dierently for
individuals characterized by the size of the rm or the industry they
work in, or by particular characteristics of their labor market history,
not only may this characteristic inuence his level of earnings, but may
in fact alter the compensation structure.
6.1 Firm size
A number of models have shown that the labor market may be segmented
into tiers of jobs that function as a ladder (e.g. Jovanovic & Nyarko
(1996)). Conceivably, these jobs are associated with increasing rm size.
On the other hand, these jobs may be within one large rm, and con-
stitute an internal hierarchy of jobs. Furthermore, some studies have
shown that rm size aects earnings and wages not only through worker
quality - which we capture with xed eects - but through rm-worker
matches (Abowd, Kramarz & Margolis 1994). If rms are homogeneous
17
Firmsize Freq Mean Mean
tenure initial exp
under 5 983 9.77 9.88
(7.89) (10.52)
5 to 20 1860 10.90 11.61
(7.16) (10.57)
20 to 200 2004 12.43 11.58
(7.78) (9.75)
200 to 2000 2243 13.92 9.08
(8.04) (9.05)
2000 and more 675 15.34 8.11
(8.20) (8.45)
Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 7: Tenure and initial experience by rmsize
within size categories, this will again be reected in dierences in the
remuneration structure.
It could be argued that rm size is a bad instrument for job ladders, as
collective bargaining agreements cover all companies within an industry,
irrespective of their size (see Section 3). However, variations do exist,
and as we will see, are important.
Results are reported in Table 8
18
. A dichotomy appears between
very large rms (more than two thousand employees) and smaller ones.
Whereas contemporaneous labor market tightness has no signicant ef-
fect on wages in the former, smaller rms are remarkably homogeneous
as to the eect of contemporaneous unemployment. Measures of previous
labor market tightness give confused signals, being sometimes estimated
with a positive coecient, and of varying precision. Again, this may be
due to the strong correlation in our data of initial and lowest unemploy-
ment rate. This eect does not disappear when constraining one or the
other of these coecients to be zero. No discernible pattern appears.
When only dierentiating two types of rms: very large rms and oth-
ers, the null that both initial and minimum unemployment have no eect
on earnings for workers at smaller rms cannot be rejected. This is no
surprise, given the volatile nature of these coecients in the subsamples
reported in Table 8
19
.
18
Firm size is reported in ve categories. Table 7 reports frequencies.
19
When allowing for variation only through rm size dummies, the coecients on
these latter indicate lower earnings at intermediate sized rms, but approximately
equal for tiny rms. Though each one is not signicant, the hypothesis that rm size
18
< 5 5 to 20 20 to 200 200 to 2000 >2000
Initial -0.0553

0.0119 0.0607

-0.0070 0.8700
(0.0164) (0.0208) (0.0141) (0.0142) (0.5880)
Current -0.0347

-0.0259

-0.0271

-0.0263

0.0069
(0.0082) (0.0073) (0.0045) (0.0041) (0.0085)
Minimum 0.0487

-0.0139 -0.0671

0.0071 0.4225

(0.0133) (0.0169) (0.0156) (0.0153) (0.1829)
Signicance at

1% level,

5% level and
+
at 10% level. Standard errors in
parentheses. All regressions include experience and tenure up to squared terms,
education in years, hours in logs, dummies for industry, marital status (single), and
a time trend.
Table 8: Results by rm size
It is worth noting that the return to initial experience is stronger
relative to rm-specic experience for tiny rms. This ts well with the
fact that rms with less than 10 employees are not subject to the fairly
stringent German layo regulations
20
, allowing them to participate more
actively in search activities. Workers' tenure at these also is lower than
elsewhere, also suggesting that job security is less than perfect.
At the other extreme, and markedly dierent from the intermediate
categories, lie the very large companies. Initial experience nds no remu-
neration, whereas rm-specic experience is more highly remunerated.
Again, one might nd this consistent with the view that large rms have
a more strongly hierarchical structure, and provide for stable internal
career paths. This nds support in the observation that average tenure
is increasing and initial experience decreasing in rm size (see Table 7).
6.2 Blue vs. white collar
As pointed out earlier, blue-collar pay in Germany is much more similar
to white-collar remuneration than in North America. However, since
we cannot distinguish between hourly pay and monthly remuneration,
the distinction according to status serves as a proxy. Alternatively, the
method of remuneration may not be the only aspect aecting remuner-
ation dynamics.
Accepting status as a proxy for remuneration methods, it is still not
clear whether blue-collar pay should vary more or less with labor-market
dummies are jointly zero is rejected.
20
See f.i. Hunt (1995) on the eects of layo costs on employment in Germany.
19
Net earnings Net wage
Blue White collar Blue White collar
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
(1) -0.0004 -0.0038 {.{ -0.0040 -0.0067 {.{
(0.0085) (0.0076) (0.0111) (0.0108)
(2) -0.0261

-0.0183

-0.0181

-0.0248

-0.0187

-0.0184
(0.0037) (0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0049) (0.0046) (-0.0045)
(3) -0.0081 -0.0096 -0.0122

0.0062 -0.0147 -0.0194
(0.0076) (0.0075) (0.0052) (0.0101) (0.0106) (-0.0075)
Coecients on (1) Initial unemployment (2) Current unemployment (3) minimum
unemployment. Signicance at

1% level,

5% level and
+
at 10% level.
Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include experience and tenure up
to squared terms, education in years, hours in logs, dummies for industry, marital
status (single), and a time trend.
Table 9: Results by worker class
conditions. In an implicit contract model, earnings are consumption, and
should, if perfectly insured, not vary with contemporaneous unemploy-
ment. However, if rms can adjust hours as well as pay, then wage rates
may well change. The labor market institutions outlined in Section 3
seem to imply that for most white-collar workers, remuneration does not
vary with hours, and this applies to a signicant portion of blue-collar
workers as well. However, given the extant discrepancies, we would ex-
pect more variance in blue-collar wage rates, rather than earnings, when
compared to white-collar wage rates.
Table 9 reports results on separate regressions for blue and white-
collar. The results are similar to those previously obtained for the pooled
male sample. Again the contemporaneous unemployment rate is the
dominant eect, though weaker for white collar workers than for blue
collar workers. On the other hand, eliminating initial unemployment
reinforces the coecient on minimum unemployment for white-collar
workers, but not for blue-collar workers. No signicant dierence appears
when using wage rates instead of earnings, as Columns (d) to (f) of Table
9 show
21
.
Rather than looking at two dierent variants of the same implicit con-
tract model, the results in Table 9 suggest something stronger. Although
21
The respective coecients (standard errors) from a regression on net hourly
wages on the pooled sample are -0.0135 (0.0062) for initial unemployment, -0.0198
(0.0027) for contemporaneous unemployment, and 0.0019 (0.0060) for minimum
unemployment.
20
a large number of blue- and white-collar workers share similar collective
bargaining agreements, individual-level contracts dier in their dynam-
ics. Specically, implicit contracts seem to play a role for white-collar
workers, but not for their blue-collar colleagues.
6.3 Industry specic regressions
Table 10 reports results when running regressions industry by industry
22
. Given that collective bargaining in Germany generally takes place on
the industry level, usually between industry-specic unions and employer
association, it is not unreasonable to think that dierent industries might
present dierent contract structures. The results indicate strong support
for the previous results, although a caveat applies. The t of most human
capital variables is not very good, though it should be pointed out that no
control was made for the industry specicity of experience, and whether
occupational changes occurred during the current tenure with the rm,
and this might well bias the estimates of the return to experience and
to tenure
23
.
It turns out that as before both contemporaneous as prior unemploy-
ment aect current earnings. The eect of prior unemployment, either
minimum or initial unemployment, is in general stronger than in the
pooled sample, the point estimate of its elasticity being approximately
equal to the elasticity of earnings with respect to contemporaneous un-
employment. However, some industries show little eect of labor market
conditions (Textile/food, trade, nancial services). This may be due to
heterogeneity within the aggregate industries used. For instance, nan-
cial services groups (white-collar) workers from the banking sector, who
mainly work at bank counters and within bank branches, with insurance
agents working on incentive contracts and in the eld. We would expect
very dierent results for each one of those groups, though at this stage
we cannot distinguish them. Further analysis is required to disentangle
the dierent eects. The main result to retain is that if labor market
conditions aect earnings, they do so through both past and current
unemployment, much as in the other subsamples analyzed before.
22
The industry classication we use is more aggregated than the one available in the
GSOEP (35 industries are distinguished there). In order to keep a suciently large
sample size, we have aggregated for the purpose of the regressions in this section into
larger categories. Regressions only include individuals with at least 2 observations in
an industry.
23
See on this subject Parent (1995), Neal (1995)
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7 Other estimation procedures
The estimation was also run with a exible form for the inter-temporal
eects. These will fully capture the eect of current unemployment for
two reasons. First, a full 90 percent of all interviews refer to earnings in
the rst quarter. This implies that the unemployment rates will almost
exclusively come from three observations in the rst quarter. Further-
more, the data on unemployment available to us is on a quarterly basis,
and intermediate months are obtained by linear interpolation. The two
quarterly observations before and after a data point are thus sucient
statistics to predict the intermediate values. The typical within-year
variation in unemployment rates is therefore fairly low
24
.
A plot of the estimated coecients on year dummies closely follows an
inverted graph of the unemployment, demonstrating a high correlation
between these dummies and the underlying unemployment rate.
[plot about here]
Including a quadratic time trend instead of year dummies has much
the same eect. It would be desirable to separately identify year ef-
fects common to all individuals and unemployment eects specic to
contracts.
8 Concluding Remarks
The main result of this paper is twofold. First, we have shown that earn-
ings dynamics in Germany are inuenced by both previous and current
labor market conditions. This contrasts with ndings for the American
labor market indicating the preponderance of previous labor market con-
ditions, and it puts a caveat to the analysis in the wage curve literature,
where wages are only correlated to current unemployment. No single
model is able to entirely explain microeconomic movements of earnings
in Germany.
We nd that the elasticity of current earnings with respect to con-
temporaneous unemployment is on the order of 10 percent, comparable
in strength to coecients found in previous studies
25
. Furthermore, we
nd the elasticity of current earnings with respect to either minimum
or initial unemployment to be about 4 percent in pooled samples and
24
In a typical year, the within-year standard deviation of unemployment is 0.056
for a mean of 4.32 (data from 1992), and over 80 percent of all observations are
concentrated on one value
25
Blanchower & Oswald (1994), Wagner (1994).
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higher in several subsamples. Though data problems do not allow for a
distinction between dierent mobility assumptions in implicit contract
models, we do nd that the state of the labor market as encountered by
a white-collar individual during her tenure with her current employer af-
fects her earnings even when controlling for today's unemployment rate.
This is consistent with implicit contract models.
But, and this is the second result, a caveat applies. The above result
is not universally valid in all parts of the labor market. A blue collar
worker in a small rm will be much more aected by contemporaneous
conditions than, say, a white collar worker in a large rm, controlling for
other aspects of productivity. Whereas the former's earnings move in
a way consistent with spot market models, the latter's earnings behave
if anything according to an implicit contract model. Dierent labor
markets seem to vary substantially as to the sensitivity of earnings to
labor market conditions.
When comparing with previous results for the U.S. labor market,
we nd that the elasticity of earnings with respect to the best labor
market conditions since the start of the current job is about 4 percent,
about a third to half of the equivalent elasticity in the U.S. labor market
(Beaudry & DiNardo 1991). Since the (short-run) elasticity of earnings
with respect to contemporaneous labor market conditions is on the order
of 12 percent at sample means and thus higher than the equivalent U.S.
measure, it is fairly dicult to draw conclusions as to which labor market
shows the \higher" exibility. However, a tentative conclusion is that
earnings in Germany seem to show no less exibility with respect to
labor market conditions than U.S. earnings.
Finally, though most of the above discussion is couched in the vocab-
ulary of implicit contracts, it is important to point out that other models
may well be consistent with the above ndings. We have pointed out
several in Section 2. Our ndings as to the size of the rm seem to show
that contracts in smaller rms are sensitive to market than those at very
large rms. One possible interpretation is that small rms are too small
to support internal labor markets, and thus substitute the marketplace
for it. Large rms, on the other hand, oer a more stable environment
in which internal labor market and hierarchical incentive systems may
function. Support is also to be found in the observation that average
tenure in our sample is higher for large rms, implying lower turnover.
Given the particular institutional structure of the German labor mar-
ket, we hypothesize that some model superimposing collective bargaining
agreements and individual contract models may be able to explain our
results. We do not supply such a model, but establish stylized facts
which such a model must be able to explain.
25
This paper is but a rst result. Further research is needed in sev-
eral directions. First, without here controlling for self-selection into the
labor force, our results indicate that labor contracts may be of a dif-
ferent structure for women. If credence is to be given to the implicit
contract model, then women are more likely to have higher mobility
cost. It remains to be determined whether correction for self-selection
will drastically change the results, as Groot et al. (1992) have shown for
the Netherlands.
Second, while we have argued that a collective bargaining or rent-
sharing model may be consistent with our ndings, we do not test this,
and further research should shed light on whether prot-related variables
inuence the wage outcome.
26
Several appendices with more detailed results are available from the
author upon demand.
27
tt
Figure 1: Comovement of inverse unemployment and earnings
28
Figure 2: Plot of German unemployment rates
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